The Roles of One Thought Experiment in Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner Heisenberg meets Thomas Kuhn. by Van Dyck, Maarten
The Roles of One Thought Experiment in
Interpreting Quantum Mechanics. Werner
Heisenberg Meets Thomas Kuhn.
Maarten Van Dyck∗
Centre for Logic and Philosophy of Science
University Ghent, Belgium
maarten.vandyck@rug.ac.be
April 7, 2003
1 Introduction
As the present volume of articles testifies, recent years saw the rise of an
interest in the roles and significance of thought experiments in different areas
of human thinking. Heisenberg’s gamma ray microscope is no doubt one of
the most famous examples of a thought experiment in physics. However, its
value has often been doubted, or even deemed to be totally misguided.
. . . a misleading attempt to “explain” the concept behind a purely
quantum mechanical theorem . . . [21, p.848]
. . . the consideration of optical analogies — such as . . . Heisenberg’s
gamma ray microscope, are mistaken. Indeed, the reasoning in these
cases is fallacious because it employs propositions belonging to optics,
not to quantum mechanics — e.g. the formula for the resolving power
of a lens . . . [4, p.149]
Maybe this is one of the reasons this particular thought experiment has not
received much detailed attention in the philosophical literature on thought
experiments up to date.
As I want to argue in this paper, this neglect is to be regretted, as one
of the philosophical accounts of the function of thought experiments can
provide the clue to a most fruitful understanding of Heisenberg’s thought
experiment. In this way the philosophical discussion on thought experiments
∗The author is Research Assistant of the Fund for Scientific Research — Flanders
(Belgium).
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could play a more exciting role than being a merely academic exercise on
the relative merits of rationalism vs. empiricism. It can directly enhance
our understanding of one of the most fascinating, but at the same time
confusing, episodes in the history of science: the development of quantum
mechanics and its interpretation. At the same time, the success of that
philosophical account — which, as the title of the paper of course already
gave away, is Thomas Kuhn’s — in helping to interpret Heisenberg’s thought
experiment, should be counted as a point in its favor. As Kuhn’s account
is almost entirely based on the analysis of only one thought experiment
in physics, i.e., Galilei’s on the speed of objects, its present extension to
another pivotal thought experiment should already be welcomed on that
grounds alone. But since the extension at the same is a broadening, as
will become clear, the role to be played by Heisenberg’s thought experiment
with respect to the philosophical discussion on thought experiments could
be even more far-reaching.
Thus arises an interesting mutual influence between this particular thought
experiment and the general philosophical discussion on thought experiments.
Accordingly the aim of the present paper is twofold: to provide an interest-
ing interpretation of the roles played by Heisenberg’s gamma ray microscope
in interpreting quantum mechanics, and to contribute to the ongoing dis-
cussions on the roles and significance of thought experiments in physics.
2 The gamma ray microscope
2.1 Heisenberg’s uncertainty paper
Heisenberg’s 1927 uncertainty paper “U¨ber den anschaulichen Inhalt der
quantentheoretische Kinematik und Mechanik” [10, 16] can be considered
to be the interpretative counterpart of his epoch-making “Quantentheoretis-
che Umdeutung kinematischer und mechanischer Beziehungen” [9], which
was published one and a half year earlier. In the latter, Heisenberg had
arrived at the basic equations of quantum mechanics by a symbolic transla-
tion of classical equations of motion, guided by a “sharpened application” of
Bohr’s correspondence principle.1 The symbolic character of the translation
was highlighted by the fact that the kinematic quantities lost their ordinary
meaning and were interpreted in a purely electromagnetic manner, directly
linked with the radiation emitted by excited atoms. The fourier components,
classically characterizing a motion, were interpreted as giving a measure for
the possible transitions between stationary states, and not as components of
a motion (therefrom the “reinterpretation of kinematical and mechanical re-
lations” in the paper’s title). Moreover, the resulting mathematical scheme,
1[5] is an excellent analysis of the pivotal role played by the correspondence principle
in the development of quantum theory.
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which soon was remarked to be matrix algebra, was very complicated, and
contained at its center a peculiar anti-classical property. The multiplication
between the matrices resulting from the translation of respectively position
(q) and momentum (p) turned out to be non-commutative, and had to sat-
isfy the following relation:
pq− qp = −ih¯. (1)
Since all classical quantities can be represented by real numbers, which of
course satisfy a commutative rule of multiplication, this property looks very
strange. Paul Dirac introduced the felicitous names of c–numbers and q–
numbers, the former standing for classical numbers, the latter for quantum,
or queer, numbers. But then what does correspond in quantum mechanics to
classical quantities like position? That is, how are the q–numbers associated
with physical quantities, apart from giving right predictions about emitted
spectra? The symbolic character of the new theory at first did not seem to
allow an answer to these questions. This is why Schro¨dinger could refer to it
as a “a formal theory of frightening, indeed repulsive, abstractness and lack
of visualizability.”2 “Heisenberg’s theory in its present form is not capable
of any physical interpretation at all,” was another claim made at the same
time.3 By 1927, a full blown transformation theory had been developed
by Jordan and Dirac, encompassing Heisenberg’s matrix scheme, as well as
Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics. Drawing from this formulation of his initial
theory, Heisenberg set out to counter these allegations in his uncertainty
paper. In particular he gave an interpretation of equation (1), which was
centered around his famous uncertainty relations and made critical use of
the gamma ray microscope thought experiment (and other similar thought
experiments).
I will follow Heisenberg’s order of presentation in first introducing the
thought experiment (although in a somewhat more elaborated form). Then
I will explain in § 2.3 how Heisenberg thought this made possible a physical
interpretation of the q–numbers, and in § 3, I will try to give a deeper
analysis of the roles played by the thought experiment.
2.2 The thought experiment
Imagine we try to determine the physical properties of a microscopic particle
using a light microscope. The accuracy with which the particle’s position in
a given x–direction can be measured is determined by the wavelength λ of
the light (the smaller the wavelength, the more sensitive the microscope — if
the wavelength is too large, the light no longer ‘sees’ the particle any longer,
just as sound waves can pass by small objects without any distortion), and in
2Quoted in a footnote in Heisenberg’s paper [16, p.82].
3Norman Campbell in 1926, quoted in [1, p.30].
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Figure 1: Schematized light microscope.
principle one could ascertain the position with the highest possible accuracy
by using radiation of the shortest possible wavelength for the illumination.
Thus, let us imagine we are in the possession of a gamma-ray microscope.
(The shortest wavelengths actually used are near ultra-violet.) As a result,
the only inaccuracy in the determination of the position would arise from
the limited resolving power of any light microscope. The resolving power
gives a measure for the ‘blurriness’ of the image of any object, that is, it
tells how far two points on the object have to lie apart to be discerned as
separate in the image. This is due to the fact that the light waves that give
rise to the image of the object enter the objective of the microscope in an
inverted cone as illustrated in Figure 1. Without going too much in detail,
light is diffracted at the object and for a sharp image to be formed, high
orders of diffraction must interfere at the image plane of the objective, but
to capture higher orders of diffraction the cone must be wide enough. The
resolving power is given by the Rayleigh criterion4:
∆x =
λ
2 sin ²
(2)
Thus, the larger the numerical aperture ², the closer two points can lie
together and still be discerned as separate (remember that λ is already
supposed to be as small as possible). Obviously this is a limit to the accuracy
with which the position of a particle in a given direction can be determined,
but again, in principle it might be made so small as to be negligible, by
constructing a gamma ray microscope with a very large numerical aperture
(² close to pi/2).
What about the particle’s momentum? It is a well known fact that
radiation shows particle-like behavior and that in the scattering of light from
4The medium between object and objective is supposed to be air.
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a particle the Compton effect should be taken into account. (By 1927 this
was an uncontestable experimental fact — in that year Compton received
the Nobel prize for his experimental demonstration of the effect named after
him.) This implies that there will be a recoil and a change in the momentum
of the particle, this change being greater if the wavelength of the radiation
is smaller, since the momentum of the incoming radiation is given by de
Broglie’s relation p = h/λ. This change in the particle’s momentum is
of course directly related to the change in the radiation’s momentum, and
could be calculated if the latter were known. But even if the momentum
of the incident radiation were completely known, there still would be an
upper limit on the accuracy with which this momentum change could ever
be determined. Another look at Figure 1 immediately teaches that all one
can ascertain about the scattered light is that it is situated somewhere in
the light-cone arriving at the microscope’s objective. Thus, all we can tell
about the direction of the light’s momentum after scattering is that lies in
between −² and ². If we further assume that the change in wavelength due
to recoil is negligible (that only the direction of momentum is changed),
then the highest accuracy with which the change in the x–component of the
light’s momentum after scattering can be determined, becomes:
∆px =
2h sin ²
λ
(3)
(The total momentum is always h/λ, and the extremal values for the x–
component of the momentum are situated at the extreme ends of the cone,
twice giving the value (h/λ) sin ² for these x–components, once with positive
and once with negative sign.) The only way to get an accurate determination
of the particle’s momentum along the x–axis is thus by using light of long
wavelength, and a microscope with small numerical aperture.
As an immediate consequence of equations (2) and (3) we find a numer-
ical equation expressing a mutual constraint on the lowest possible inaccu-
racies in position and momentum determination:
∆x∆px = h. (4)
Obviously the demands of accuracy for the determination of position and
momentum of a particle pull in opposite direction!5 Heisenberg comments
in his paper:
5Heisenberg’s original account was flawed in that he did not include the effect of the
finite aperture of the microscope, and only considered the effect of the momentum (and
thus wavelength) of the radiation. But a closer look at the determination of the momen-
tum immediately shows that if it was not for the impossibility of determining the angle of
scattering, the momentum change could be calculated, and thus there would be no result-
ing inaccuracy in the particle’s momentum. In a note added in proof Heisenberg corrects
this mistake, which was pointed out to him by Niels Bohr. As has often been remarked
in the literature, and implicitly admitted by Heisenberg, his mistake was influenced by
his desire to do away with all wave concepts in the discussion (for more on this, see [1,
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Thus, the more precisely the position is determined, the less precisely
the momentum is known, and conversely. In this circumstance we see
a direct physical interpretation [“direkte anschauliche Erlau¨terung”] of
the equation pq− qp = −ih¯. [16, p.64]
2.3 The queerness interpreted
The direct physical interpretation Heisenberg alludes to consists in the fact
that the thought experiment allows him to see that the q–numbers need
not keep their symbolic character, but can be given a conceptual content
that is closely linked with their original kinematic meaning. As the analysis
of the hypothetical gamma ray microscope shows, there exists a certain
latitude with which the classical concepts of position and momentum can
be simultaneously determined. This fact obviously has implications for the
sharpness with which these concepts must be defined at the theoretical level.
Thus only the uncertainty which is specified by equation [(4)] cre-
ates room for the validity of the relations which find their most preg-
nant expression in the quantum-mechanical commutation relations,
pq− qp = −ih¯. That uncertainty makes possible this equation with-
out requiring that the physical meaning of the quantities p and q be
changed. [16, p.68]
Heisenberg then proceeds to prove that the commutation relations indeed
reflect a limitation on the sharpness with which concepts like position and
momentum are simultaneously defined in quantum theory. He first derives
the famous uncertainty relations from the Dirac–Jordan formulation of the
quantum theory,6 and then gives a more intuitive geometrical interpretation
of that theory, in terms of the relation between experimental questions and
the principal axes of matrices.
The Dirac–Jordan transformation theory assigns to any quantity a prob-
ability amplitude for finding the numerical value of that quantity in a given
numerical interval, and it moreover gives rules for transforming these am-
plitudes, so that one could find the relation between e.g. the probabilities
for finding a numerical value for q between q′ and q′ + dq′ and for finding
p between p′ and p′ + dp′. If we have the probability amplitude S(q′) for
the quantity q, then |S(q′)|2dq′ gives the probability for finding a q–value
between q′ and q′ + dq′. The average value of q then can be denoted as:
q =
∫
q′|S(q′)|2dq′, and accordingly the uncertainty with which the value of
pp.70–74]). Apparently Heisenberg sometimes was a slow student, as he already nearly
had failed his doctoral examination in 1923 by not being able to answer questions on the
resolving power of light microscopes (see e.g. [19, Vol.2, pp.63–69]).
6I will present a slightly generalized and more straightforward derivation of the uncer-
tainty relations, as can be found e.g. in [13].
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q is known is given by:
δq =
(
2
∫
(q′ − q)2|S(q′)|2dq′
)1/2
. (5)
The uncertainty of p can be defined analogously. These uncertainties reflect
the fact that only a probability amplitude is given for the quantities, without
further specification on the actual numerical values. Most important, the
transformation rules relating the probability amplitudes for q and p imply
that the uncertainties δq and δp are not independent. A straightforward
calculation then shows that:
δqδp ≥ h
2pi
. (6)
This is the general form of Heisenberg’s uncertainty relations for position
and momentum.
Remark that only at this point one could unhesitatingly speak about po-
sition and momentum, physical quantities which had disappeared in Heisen-
berg’s original 1925 paper. In the meantime these concepts had already
reappeared in Born’s statistical interpretation of the wave function, and its
further elaboration by Pauli, Dirac and Jordan. Born’s breakthrough con-
sisted in the realization that quantum mechanics did contain information on
the states of particles after scattering, albeit only statistical, as encoded by
probability amplitudes. This insight was then quickly extended to include
information on the position and momentum of particles. However, the pre-
cise conceptual content of the kinematical quantities was not entirely clear
yet, as the non-commutative character still remained puzzling at the physical
level. This is where Heisenberg’s thought experiment comes in. His analy-
sis of the hypothetical experimental situation shows that even when talking
about the classical quantities of position and momentum, these quantities
are not unambiguously simultaneously determinable. But this implies that,
if one wants to apply these concepts to describe what happens in an experi-
mental set-up, a certain leeway exists. As the analysis in § 2.2 shows, if one
considers a situation in which the position of a particle can be ascertained
with the highest possible accuracy, then one need not ascribe a definite mo-
mentum to the particle, as its possible value cannot show up in the same
experiment; thus it becomes possible to interpret the uncertainty relations
as stating that position and momentum are not simultaneously well-defined,
that there exist a mutual and intrinsic uncertainty in their definition. One
can take this freedom a step further and enunciate an operationalist attitude
towards the definition of concepts: ‘one need not’ is then read as ‘one can
not’, making the step from an epistemological to an ontological uncertainty
compulsory. This is the strategy advocated by Heisenberg in his uncertainty
paper, as the following quotation shows — but it is important to realize that
the weaker reading already suffices for the reinterpretation to go through,
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that is, one need not equate the means of measurement with meaning proper
to argue that limitations in means of measurement imply a freedom in the
meaning ascribed to terms (I will come back to the issue of operationalism
in § 3.3).
All concepts which can be used in classical theory for the description of
a mechanical system can also be defined exactly for atomic processes
in analogy to the classical concepts. The experiments which provide
such a definition themselves suffer an indeterminacy introduced purely
by the observational procedures we use when we ask of them the si-
multaneous determination of two canonically conjugate quantities. [16,
p.68]
The exact form of the uncertainty relations, which is of course already im-
portant in its own right as a theorem of quantum mechanics, then serves
to further justify the claims made by Heisenberg about the applicability of
classical concepts, as it shows that the uncertainty that exists at the theo-
retical level (equation (6)) indeed is of the same order of magnitude as the
leeway provided by the experimental procedures (equation (4)). This would
become a basic theme in Niels Bohr’s philosophy of quantum mechanics,
as exemplified in his numerous remarks about the agreement between the
possibilities of observation and those of definition.
At this point, one could complain that the foregoing does not really
make clear how all this provides “a direct physical interpretation” of the
non-commutative character of the quantities, which is after all an alge-
braic property. The real interpretative work rather seems to be done by
a consequence of this property, viz. the uncertainty relations (6). However,
Heisenberg proceeds by giving a physical interpretation of certain algebraic
properties of the quantum mechanical scheme in the Dirac–Jordan formula-
tion. The basic insight that can be gained from the thought experiment is
the realization that every experimental situation “divides physical quantities
into “known” and “unknown” (or more or less accurately known quantities)
in a way characteristic of the experiment in question” [16, p.70]. In quan-
tum mechanics, on the other hand, the value of a quantity is given by the
diagonal terms of the corresponding matrix, and the fact that two matri-
ces cannot be always simultaneously diagonalized — a direct consequence
of the non-commutative character — then reflects the fact that the corre-
sponding quantities belong to mutual exclusive experimental situations. As
a result any experimental situation can be associated with a direction in a
multidimensional matrix space (in which directions correspond with possi-
ble principle axes of the matrices). The non-commuting character of the
q–numbers corresponding with q and p can now be understood as reflect-
ing the fact that both quantities cannot be simultaneously determined with
unlimited accuracy.
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3 A function for thought experiments
3.1 Conceptual transformations
One of the earliest philosophical discussions of thought experiments is Tho-
mas Kuhn’s 1964 “A Function for Thought Experiments” [18]. In his paper
Kuhn discusses what afterwards has been called Kuhn’s paradox of thought
experiments [17, p.1].
Granting that every successful thought experiment embodies in its de-
sign some prior information about the world, that information is not
itself at issue in the experiment. On the contrary, if we have to do
with a real thought experiment, the empirical data upon which it rests
must have been both well-known and generally accepted before the
experiment was even conceived. How, then, relying exclusively upon
familiar data, can a thought experiment lead to new knowledge or to
new understanding of nature? [18, p.241]
The first suggestion Kuhn considers is that a thought experiment is primarily
aimed at uncovering a confusion in the scientist’s conceptual apparatus. Its
function would be to show that some of the concepts used by the scientist are
inconsistent. The paradox disappears because the knowledge gained is solely
about the conceptual apparatus, not about nature itself. And obviously
no new empirical information is needed, since the inconsistency was there
already, slumbering as it were, only waiting to be revealed. Moreover, a
superficial glance at some famous thought experiments immediately shows
that they are aimed indeed at unveiling some kind of contradiction in the
scientist’s mode of thought.
Nevertheless, Kuhn disagrees with this view since it rests on too naive
a view on the use and definition of concepts. However, having brought
into focus the issue of conceptual transformation, he can proceed to a more
sophisticated view, which still allows him to disentangle the apparent para-
dox. The problem with the suggested solution is that it rests on some kind of
analytic/synthetic distinction that cannot be maintained, as Kuhn already
famously argued in his “Structure of Scientific Revolutions”. Concepts never
come free from physical implications, and as such their use always provides
information about what the world is like. This of course implies that they
can err in a non-logical sense, i.e., that the world is not exactly as pre-
supposed by the concept, and exposing these kind of errors is the function
Kuhn ascribes to thought experiments. In this they are not very different
from ordinary, natural, laboratory, real — or whatever one likes to call them
— experiments, the major difference being that thought experiments rely
entirely on empirical information that was already at hand, but was not
completely assimilated yet. By making this information explicit in an imag-
ined situation, it can be shown that the conceptual apparatus used by the
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scientist does not fit situations to which it should apply. In this way thought
experiments can teach conceptual reformation, which in its turn can teach
something about the world, and not only about our conceptual apparatus.
The concepts “corrected” in the aftermath of thought-experiments dis-
played no intrinsic confusion. If their use raised problems for the
scientist, those problems were like the ones to which the use of any ex-
perimentally based law or theory would expose them. They arose, that
is, not from his mental equipment alone but from difficulties discovered
in the attempt to fit that equipment to previously unassimilated expe-
rience. Nature rather than logic alone was responsible for the apparent
confusion. [18, p.261]
Kuhn tries to defend his claim, that the contradiction exposed in a thought
experiment is not of a purely logical origin, by an analysis of Galilei’s thought
experiment on the speed of bodies. In this thought experiment Galilei tries
to establish that the Aristotelian concept of speed can give rise to incompat-
ible assessments of the same situation. The thought experiment could only
be effective if the Aristotelians were prepared to accept that their concepts
should apply to the situation presented, and that our world is like the sit-
uation presented. On the other hand, if the thought experiment was aimed
at a logical inconsistency, the aim would be to establish the contradiction in
all possible worlds. But then why the emphasis on the fact that our world
is indeed like it is supposed to be in the hypothetical situation? Moreover,
there is not a hint of an argument that all possible worlds should be alike
in the relevant aspects that cause the contradictory assessments; and quite
understandable, since it is rather easy to think of possible worlds in which
the contradiction would never arise, thus making the Aristotelian concepts
perfectly well suited. The empirical presuppositions underlying the applica-
bility of the Aristotelian concepts of speed could have been satisfied, but as
it turns out, this is not the case in our world.
Kuhn’s analysis thus suggest that one important function of thought
experiments is the role they play in teaching conceptual transformation.
Before revisiting the gamma ray microscope, it is worth quoting Werner
Heisenberg on conceptual transformation, to bring out the close affinities
that exist between his and Kuhn’s views on this issue. I think this can
help to underscore the fact that Heisenberg was not just the brilliant but
philosophically naive physicist, whose conceptual analysis of quantum me-
chanics, as exemplified by his thought experiment, only served self-justifying
purposes. His closeness to Kuhn’s views on conceptual transformation, but
thirty years predating them, makes it very plausible to assume that his use of
the thought experiment was indeed intended to play the role Kuhn ascribes
to thought experiments in general.
[T]he validity of classical physics is limited by the lack of precision
of the concepts contained in its axioms. . . . [T]here is no criterion
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allowing an a priori assessment, as to whether the application of a
term is objectionable or not. . . . [T]herefore the only possible progress
for science seemed to lie in the unhesitating use, in the first place, of
existing terms for the description of experience, and the revision of
these terms from time to time as demanded by new experiences. [12,
p.43]
As Kuhn reminds us, these “new experiences” can also come to us in the form
of a thought experiment, incorporating well known, but not completely as-
similated, empirical knowledge. This is exactly what happens in the gamma
ray microscope thought experiment.
3.2 The microscope revisited
Heisenberg’s thought experiment has frequently been criticized as a mis-
guided attempt to give a classical explanation of a quantum mechanical
phenomenon (e.g. the quotations given in § 1, but more examples could
easily be found). The underlying idea is that a consistent treatment of mea-
surements made with a gamma ray microscope should invoke only quantum
mechanical considerations (bracketing, of course, the perennial problems
surrounding the notion of measurement in quantum mechanics). Heisen-
berg’s analysis, on the other hand, has to be bluntly inconsistent since he
uses the idea of a particle having both position and momentum to argue
that it cannot have these properties. . .
Following Kuhn’s analysis of the function of thought experiments, and
Heisenberg’s own understanding of conceptual transformations, we can now
see how misguided these critiques are (but see § 3.3 for a qualification of
this claim). The thought experiment presents us with a situation to which
the classical concepts are naively thought to apply, and then shows some
unexpected consequences. A fully quantum mechanical treatment would
teach us nothing on the conceptual level, clearly contrary to Heisenberg’s
intentions. However, whereas in Kuhn’s original treatment, these unex-
pected consequences were supposed to be contradictions, in Heisenberg’s
case one is confronted with an ambiguity. Probably this is the main rea-
son why the logic of the argument is not always clearly understood. But
nothing in Kuhn’s analysis seems to exclude such an extension, since the
function assigned to thought experiments is teaching conceptual transfor-
mation. Clearly this can be achieved via different routes, i.e., by exposing
an ambiguity as well as an inconsistency, since both can be thought to be
signs of a confusion in the conceptual apparatus as applied to our world. As
in Kuhn’s and Heisenberg’s views on conceptual transformation, this ambi-
guity could not be assessed a priori, but only by confronting the conceptual
apparatus with some well known empirical facts, i.e., the formulas express-
ing the resolving power of a light microscope and the Compton effect. By
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devising an imaginary experimental situation in which this empirical knowl-
edge has to be taken into account, Heisenberg can force his contemporary
“Aristotelians” — the defenders of a classical worldview — to admit that
our world is such that position and momentum need not be simultaneously
ascribed to microscopic objects; and thus, that the q–numbers can still be
given a kinematical interpretation.
Maybe I have been overstating the point by calling this an ambiguity
in the conceptual apparatus of classical physics as applied to our world?
After all, there seems to be nothing ambiguous in applying concepts where
they need not be (that position and momentum are not simultaneously un-
ambiguously determinable — this follows uncontestable from the thought
experiment — does not imply that they are only ambiguously applicable).
However, I believe that the assessment of this claim must be altered in view
of the existing physical knowledge at the time of Heisenberg’s thought ex-
periment. If one takes serious the insight that classical physics cannot tell
the complete story about the world, and that much was agreed upon already
at the first Solvay conference in 1911, where the attendants seemed to reach
a consensus on the fact that the by then known quantum phenomena could
not be dealt with in the classical scheme — a conclusion which of course
had been extensively confirmed by the subsequent developments of physics
— then the fact that there exists a leeway in the applicability of classical
concepts should be taken serious as well. If one accepts that classical physics
has its limits in the microscopic domain, then the discovery that position
and momentum need not be simultaneously ascribed in this domain should
not be met with a shoulder-shrugging “don’t care about what needn’t be
done”. Something must be done, that much was for sure, and here was the
place were things could be done. Against that background, I think it is not
too strong to call the conceptual leeway an ambiguity. After all, what else
is an ambiguity than an underdetermination by the facts that potentially
causes problems? The introduction of Heisenberg’s uncertainty paper ex-
plicitly discusses the suggestion that the simultaneous ascription of position
and momentum in a discontinuous world might cause insurmountable prob-
lems, thus adding to the plausibility of the idea that it is indeed here that
lies a source of many of the interpretative problems.
Nonetheless, Heisenberg seems to have been troubled by the worry that
an ambiguity was not enough — an ambiguity of course can turn out to be
harmless, and he firmly believed that this ambiguity was not harmless — as
he added an extra premiss to his argument, i.e., an operationalist view on
the definition of physical concepts, which makes the simultaneous ascription
of position and momentum simply inconsistent, thus bringing the form of
the argument even closer to Kuhn’s analysis. However, at the same time
this takes away a lot of the strength of the thought experiment, as this extra
premiss is rather controversial. In opting for this strategy, Heisenberg might
have been influenced by a kind of revolutionary zeal in which he not only
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wanted to argue for the possibility of a conceptual reformation, but also for
its necessity (see Mara Beller [1] for a rather unsympathetic account of this
aspect of Heisenberg). On numerous occasions Heisenberg clearly stressed
the necessity of leaving behind old ideas about causality, visualizability etc.;
and he thought to have established such in his uncertainty paper, of which
the last sentence reads:
Because all experiments are subject to the laws of quantum mechan-
ics, and therefore to equation (4), it follows that quantum mechanics
establishes the final failure of causality. [16, p.83]
The failure of causality comes from the impossibility of knowing the present
exactly, i.e., values for both position and momentum, thus excluding the
possibility of completely predicting the future. This failure can only be
taken to be final if the uncertainties are necessary, but remember that this
only follows from the thought experiment on the extra assumption of oper-
ationalism; but why should that be necessary. . . So, should we follow Beller
in her assessment of Heisenberg, and conclude that he simply wanted too
much to follow from his example? That is, did he put the thought experi-
ment to more work than could be done by it? As I will briefly argue in the
following section, this question can not be given a straightforward answer:
the claims about finality need not find its origin in the thought experiment,
since they arise already from Heisenberg’s more general views on the nature
of scientific knowledge and methodology; however, the thought experiment
did suggest a physical explanation for this finality, which made the conclu-
sion more palatable and was frequently used by Heisenberg, but later on
turned out to be susceptible to damaging criticism.
Focussing on the claims about the failure of causality — or what comes
down to the same, about the completeness of quantum mechanics — will
have the benefit of highlighting another role played by the thought experi-
ment. Most importantly, I think having exposed the precise function of the
thought experiment in conceptual transformation, will help in being more
careful in assessing some controversial issues surrounding the notion of dis-
turbance in the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
3.3 Operationalism, finality, and disturbance
Let us begin by taking another look at the last sentence of the uncertainty
paper, in which Heisenberg announces “the final failure of causality”. The
reason he cites for this conclusion is the fact that “all experiments are sub-
ject to the laws of quantum mechanics”. This is of course highly significant.
As explained in § 2.1, the main aim of the uncertainty paper was to provide
a conceptual interpretation for the q–numbers, and one can take Heisenberg
to have been successful on this point. Moreover, on the interpretation he
proposes, quantum mechanics indeed implies the breakdown of (one idea
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of) causality on the grounds mentioned by Heisenberg. (Of course one can
quarrel with Heisenberg’s characterization of the idea of causality.) This
could only be argued after the reinterpretation, i.e., classical kinematic con-
cepts remain applicable, but with intrinsic uncertainties due to the fact that
they are linked with different experimental situations. But once this inter-
pretation is in place, the thought experiment has no further role to play in
the breakdown of causality, which becomes a consequence of the validity of
quantum mechanics.
The foregoing paragraph can best be summarized by the statement that
the uncertainty relations are of a purely theoretical nature, but that their
nature as uncertainties follows from the interpretation partly based on the
thought experiment — on another interpretation, the uncertainty relations
might have another significance, as witnessed, e.g., by David Bohm’s inter-
pretation.
What about the finality of this failure? On the supposition that quantum
mechanics in Heisenberg’s interpretation is completely valid, this validity in-
deed implies this finality. All situations in nature then behave as prescribed
by the theory, implying the universality of the uncertainties, and thus the
finality of the failure. No situations can be found for which the principle of
causality holds. A further, maybe surprising consequence of this fact is that
operationalism now is shown to be true on physical grounds! The validity
of quantum mechanics in Heisenberg’s interpretation — and remember that
operationalism need not be presupposed for his reinterpretation of classical
concepts to go through — implies that the applicability of classical concepts
is tied to their measurement in experimental situations (a fact highlighted
by the talk about “observables” in standard quantum mechanics). Maybe
it is even not too farfetched to suggest that Heisenberg first reached this
conclusion, and only then inserted his operationalist remarks in the presen-
tation of his thought experiment.7 However, this does not take away from
the fact that the significance of a physically based operationalism is entirely
different from a that of a philosophical operationalism, and that Heisenberg
clearly alludes to the latter in his paper. The major difference is that the
former form of operationalism stands and falls with the physical theories on
which it is grounded, whereas the latter is supposed to be independent of
any changes in physical knowledge. It is clear that a philosophical opera-
tionalism is thus much stronger, and accordingly should be looked at with
7Although I want to question the view of the philosophically naive Heisenberg, it is
clear that in his scientific papers he often used philosophical doctrines to give a post hoc
justification for some of his more far-reaching results. A clear example of this can be found
in the positivist discourse in his 1925 Umdeutung paper, in which he claimed to start from
the principle that only observable quantities should enter a significant physical theory
— Olivier Darrigol [5, pp.273–276] convincingly shows that this was not how Heisenberg
reached his results (and luckily, since the scheme had to contain some non-observable
phase factors to be successful).
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much more suspicion.
The claim that no situations can be found for which the principle of
causality holds, or what comes down to the same on Heisenberg’s interpre-
tation, for which the uncertainty relations are violated, has profound im-
plications. Therefore, it should be made plausible on independent grounds,
and not only by referring to the successes of quantum mechanics in dealing
with other kind of situations. This is another important task served by the
thought experiment: it shows that, even if one does not take the validity
of quantum mechanics for granted, generally accepted empirical laws imply
that the uncertainty relations will be valid. Apparently nature is such as
prescribed by the validity of quantum mechanics: it is at least very well
possible that quantum mechanics would be valid and complete. . . 8 Apart
from the critical role of showing classical concepts to be ambiguous, the
thought experiment thus also serves a constructive “semi-empirical” role, as
exemplified by the agreement between equations (4) and (6), which helps to
argue for the general validity of the uncertainty relations.9
The real weight of the proclaimed finality of the failure of causality is
carried by the complete validity of quantum mechanics. This validity can
be made plausible by the number of empirical successes (which, however,
was not very high at the time of Heisenberg’s uncertainty paper) and semi-
empirical successes, i.e., the thought experiment (as explained in the last
paragraph); but in the end, believing in completeness comes down to an
act of faith. As testified by his other writings, Heisenberg believed that
there were some further good reasons for proselytization. I will not go
into what I would call “internal reasons”, having to do with the elegance,
comprehensiveness, etc. of the mathematical scheme, taken together with
Heisenberg’s experience of the dreadful state-of-the-art before the advent of
quantum mechanics. More important, I think, is the methodological reason
that brought Heisenberg to believe in the fruitfulness of such a postulation.
This has to do with
[. . . ] the really fundamental characteristic of a physical discovery. It
is not the result of, but the precondition for a clear delineation of the
range of applicability of the discovered concepts. [12, p.52]
8Maybe one could quarrel with the claim that quantum mechanics is not taken for
granted in the thought experiment, since it crucially uses the fact that light has both a
wave and particle character, thus potentially making the consistency-check self-evident?
This complaint neglects the fact that the wave-particle duality was an empirical fact, well
established before the advent of quantum mechanics, as recounted in [22].
9Some quotations from Heisenberg’s 1929 Chicago lectures [13] show that Heisenberg
indeed intended them to play this role: “but this does not circumvent the uncertainty
relation” (p.22) “The change in momentum which is necessarily produced by the last
observation is subject to such an indeterminateness that the uncertainty relation is again
fulfilled” (p.25) “The problem is therefore to determine the velocity in the y–direction, and
it is to be shown that the knowledge of the y–coordinate is destroyed by this measurement
to the extent demanded by the uncertainty relation.” (p.26)
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When a fundamentally new theory is put forward, this is bound to have
profound implications for the way physical concepts are used. The prime
example before quantum mechanics of course was Einstein’s theory of special
relativity. If one takes the stance that the new theory is complete, then,
due to the possibility of a new delineation of the range of applicability of
concepts, this provides one with new knowledge about what is observable
in nature. After all, as Heisenberg recounts being taught by Einstein [15,
pp.269–270], it is theory which determines what is observable. Even more
significant in the case of the uncertainty relations, theory can also tell what is
not observable! One of Heisenberg’s favorite ways of expressing this insight
was to enunciate the uncertainty relations to the status of principle, thus
mimicking Einstein’s principle of the finiteness of the speed of light.
The restrictions of classical concepts as enunciated in the uncertainty
relations acquire their creative value only by making them questions
of principle. [12, p.47]
By making them questions of principle, it is posited that the uncertainty re-
lations reflect a fundamental limitation, and thus that they indeed determine
what is unobservable in nature. In this way, one clearly sees Heisenberg con-
sciously postulating the theory’s completeness for methodological reasons.10
I will not discuss the merits of this fascinating strategy, as I only wanted
to indicate why the “necessity” of the failure of causality does have other,
more subtle, origins than the thought experiment — this is often overlooked
by commentators. As to the charge of dogmatism, most effectively levelled
by Beller, I would like to stress that Heisenberg clearly wanted this com-
pleteness to be understood in a non-absolute way; that is, to be complete
the theory has to be correct within the range of applicability of its concepts,
but new limitations on this applicability can be unveiled by new theories,
and probably will be [12, p.51]. Heisenberg considered classical mechanics
to be a complete theory, despite its limitations in domain of validity, and
accordingly expected a similar limitation on the completeness of quantum
mechanics.11
The necessity of the failure of causality can be traced to other, more
subtle, origins than the thought experiment, and still Heisenberg often sug-
10See also [13, pp.3–4]: “The starting-point of the critique of the relativity theory was
the postulate that there is no signal velocity greater than that of light. In a similar manner,
th[e] lower limit to the accuracy with which certain variables can be known simultaneously
may be postulated as a law of nature (in the form of the so-called uncertainty relations)
and made the starting-point of the critique which forms the subject matter of the following
pages. These uncertainty relations give us that measure of freedom from the limitations
of classical concepts which is necessary for a consistent description of atomic processes.”
11This brings Heisenberg in some respects surprisingly close to Einstein on the issue of
the completeness of quantum mechanics — in particular if we follow the interpretation of
Einstein’s position as presented in Arthur Fine’s [8].
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gested it also finds its origins there. One might say that the suggestion
coming from the thought experiment simply turned out to be irresistible:
the uncertainties are due to an unavoidable disturbance present in any mea-
surement (remember the recoil suffered by the particle in the gamma ray
microscope).
The possibility of statistical inter-connections [as opposed to determin-
istic] is created only by regarding the effect of the measuring apparatus
on the system to be measured as a partial disturbance uncontrollable
in principle. [12, p.49]
Something very weird is going on here; Heisenberg is trying to do the impos-
sible — to give a causal explanation why causal explanations are impossible,
as it was aptly put by Karl Popper [20, p.248]. . .
The disturbance finds its origin in the classical description of the hy-
pothetical measurement with the gamma ray microscope. It is a particle
having both classical position and momentum that is being disturbed in
the measurement process, thus rendering a simultaneous knowledge of both
impossible. But how can Heisenberg claim at the same time that the uncer-
tainty relations — implying the statistical character of the theory — find
their origin in quantum mechanics (“all experiments are subject to the laws
of quantum mechanics”), and in a classical description of the measurement
process? Clearly he cannot, especially as his interpretation of the laws of
quantum mechanics is explicitly anti-classical (a particle does not have si-
multaneous position and momentum).
I will not try to give a diagnosis of Heisenberg’s apparent schizophrenia
on this issue, and only remark that in this episode Mara Beller’s idea of
a “dialogical approach” to the history of science seems to be very fruitful.
What I would like to do, is to point out how my analysis of the thought
experiment can help to disentangle some of the thorny issues surrounding
the disturbance idea. It should be clear by now that the disturbance present
in the thought experiment, that is, in the classical description of the mea-
surement process, has an important role to play — it creates room for the
validity of quantum mechanics in an apparent classical world. However, as
such it plays a semantical role: it teaches us something about the possible
meanings of classical concepts (in our world), it does not tell us what really
happens in the world when we try to measure the properties of a particle
(remember that the world is supposed to be such that quantum mechanics is
true of it, and not classical mechanics). Seen in this way, one could say that
the disturbance “causes” equation (4), but not (6), where only the latter
expresses a genuine quantum mechanical law.12 Heisenberg acknowledged
12Incidentally, if interpreted in this way, I think a large part of Heisenberg’s schizophre-
nia can be seen to disappear; it turns out that when explicitly using disturbance language,
he is often talking about the origins of equation (4), which is not the uncertainty principle,
that is, not a law of quantum mechanics!
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that the idea of disturbance played several distinct roles:
This . . . disturbance . . . assumes importance in many different ways.
To start with, it is the reason for the appearance of statistical laws
of nature in quantum mechanics. Further it imposes a limit on the
application of the classical concepts . . . [11, p.15]
We can thus have the disturbance playing its valid role in the conceptual
transformation, without having to suppose that it does so by offering an
inconsistent physical explanation, where none is to be had.
The idea of disturbance causing the uncertainties is not only incoherent,
in 1935 it was also shown to be false, on the supposition that all distur-
bances propagate locally, in the famous EPR thought experiment [7]. Niels
Bohr’s answer to this allegation is quite revealing: he insisted that the dis-
turbance has to be understood as an “influence on the very conditions which
define the possible types of prediction regarding the future behavior” of a
system, as there is “no question of a mechanical disturbance of the system
under investigation” [3, p.148] (my emphasis). The conditions which de-
fine the possible types of prediction, of course are the limits of application
of the classical concepts. In their [2], Beller and Fine convincingly show
the difficulties one runs into if one tries to salvage the idea of disturbance
causing the validity of the uncertainty relations. But, as my discussion was
intended to show, this does not imply that a mechanical disturbance cannot
play another role — a role that is pivotal in introducing classical concepts
in interpreting quantum mechanical laws, and that need not stand or fall
with one’s opinion on the values of operationalism.
4 Conclusion
Let me briefly try to recapitulate the main strands running through this
paper. Heisenberg’s gamma ray microscope can be seen to fulfill two im-
portant roles in interpreting quantum mechanics: it shows the way for a
conceptual transformation of classical concepts that is suited for quantum
mechanical laws, and it helps to argue for the validity of these laws (the
semi-empirical successes referred to in § 3.3). It does so by presenting us
with a hypothetical situation in which well known empirical laws convey
some important insights; insights which could only be made explicit in this
kind of situation. The implicit simultaneous ascription of both momentum
and position to the particle in the thought experiment is not simply an in-
consistency on behalf of Heisenberg, but is an essential part of his argument
about the limited applicability of these concepts. Although this was often
blurred by Heisenberg himself, the thought experiment need not be taken to
be about tracing the origins of the uncertainty relations, since these come
from the theory. By focussing on Kuhn’s analysis of the function of thought
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experiments, we could retract what is genuinely valuable about the thought
experiment — the way it helps to argue for conceptual transformation —
without having to accept all the conclusions drawn from the disturbance in
the measurements made with the hypothetical gamma ray microscope, thus
qualifying claims like the following in an important way:
The concept of disturbance, inaugurated in Heisenberg’s uncertainty
paper, is an ill-fated and inconsistent one. . . [1, p.156]
Kuhn’s analysis not only teaches something about Heisenberg’s thought ex-
periment, there is also a reciprocal relation: we can see that not only straight
inconsistencies showing up in a thought experiment pave the way for concep-
tual transformation, but that ambiguities can play the same role in the right
kind of context. Moreover, the thought experiment played more roles than
the one function ascribed to it by Kuhn, as it also served as semi-empirical
evidence for the correctness of the interpreted quantum mechanical laws.
There are several things I did not do in this paper. I did not enter
upon discussions concerning visualizability in quantum mechanics.13 This
certainly is an important shortcoming, as these discussions are highly rele-
vant with respect to the related ones on the roles of thought experiments —
for instance, one could argue that the classical picture used in the thought
experiment serves as a kind of “intuition enhancer” to prepare us to the
quantum world where there is no simultaneous reality ascribed to quantities
like position and momentum. I also did not comment on what should be
the right interpretation of the uncertainty relations (are they linked with
state preparation, with measurement, . . . , do they apply only to ensembles,
or also to individual particles, etc.). Heisenberg used the freedom in apply-
ing classical concepts that the thought experiment showed him to exist, but
of course other strategies are also possible (and maybe preferable on other
grounds). After all, the thought experiment is only a preliminary step to-
wards an interpretation of quantum mechanics, showing “something” about
classical concepts and our world, but interpreting this “something” requires
genuine creativity.
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